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1.1 Overview
The overlapping generations (OLG) model has been widely used to study a variety
of questions in macroeconomic theory and policy. Some of the most interesting
properties of the OLG model are associated with its ability to produce steady-state
equilibria in which agents hold unbacked government liabilities such as fiat currency
or unfunded debt, even when there are no transactions frictions and even when the
government does not interfere with the operation of the market for privately-issued
liabilities. These equilibria are commonly described as “monetary steady states”
although the unbacked government liabilities are not necessarily best interpreted as
fiat money and will not be given that interpretation here. Monetary steady states
can arise when OLG models are specified to produce what Gale (1973) calls the
Samuelson case in which there is excess demand for privately issued assets at the
“golden rule” real interest rate (equal to the output growth rate). This shortage of
privately issued assets creates apotential demandfor unbackedgovernment liabilities.
In the alternative classical case there is excess supply of privately issued assets at
the golden-rule real rate and there is no role for unbacked debt.1
Until recently, most research involving OLG models was conducted using highly
stylized specifications. In the vast majority of cases the agents lived for only two
periods, and in most cases the models also abstracted from production or capital. In
recent years, however, macroeconomists have become increasingly interested in gen-
eral equilibrium models that are “realistic” in the sense that [1] the decision problems
facing agents in the models are similar in nature, scale and timing to the problems
facing agents in actual economies, and [2] the properties of the data generated by the
modelscan bedirectly compared to theproperties of actual macroeconomic data. Pi-
oneers in the effort to develop such modelsinclude Kydland and Prescott (1982) and
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). Auerbach and Kotlikoff extend Diamond’s (1965)
nonstochastic overlapping-generations model of production and capital by introduc-
ing households who live for many periods and a much more elaborate public sector.
Auerbach and Kotlikoff calibrate their model and use it to study the effects of alter-
native fiscal policies. Their calibration strategy produces classical-case equilibria —
as do the strategies used in the extensive literature that has grown out of their work.
We believe that applied theorists working in macroeconomics and public finance
should also be interested in calibrated OLG models that produce Samuelson-case
equilibria. An important differencebetween Samuelson-case andclassical-case economies
is that in the Samuelson case the existence of a demand for unbacked government
liabilities allows the government to influence real interest rates and other realvan-
‘Government liabilities are said to be unbacked if they can be rolled over forever without the
need for primary (net of interest) budget surpluses to cover any part ofthe interest or principal.
1ables by changing the growth rate of the nominal supply of these liabilities. These
changes have real effects because they produce direct shifts in the neal supply of
funds available to private borrowers. Thus, the predictions of models that support
Samuelson-case equilibria are potentially consistent with the widely held belief that
changes in monetary and fiscal policy canhave significant and persistent real effects.
In the area of fiscal policy, Samuelson-case models predict that pay-as-you-go
social security schemes may be welfare improving — a prediction that may help
explain why the U.S. and most other developed countries have constructed such
schemes. Samuelson-case models can produce significant departures from Ricardian
equivalence, and they may consequently have the potential to explain persistent
changes in the levels of real interest rates and investment such as those that occured
in the U.S. during the 1970s and 1980s — a period when there were also persistent
changes in the nature of fiscal policy and the size of the national debt relative to GDP.
In addition, Samuelson-case models can support equilibria that display a variety of
different sorts of endogenous expectations-driven fluctations — deterministic and
stochastic cycles, chaotic and sunspot dynamics, etc. — that may help explain
business cycle phenomena.2
In the realm of monetary policy, multipeniod/calibrated Samuelson-case models
may provide an applied-theoretical framework that is consistent with recent empiri-
cal evidence of significant departures from long run superneutrality.3 In particular,
these models may help explain explain both the apparent success of Federal Reserve
policy in reducing the long-run inflation rate and the increase in the level of real
interest rates that seems to have accompanied this effort. In recent work with two-
period OLG models, Espinosa and Russell (1998a,b) show that specifications that
support equilibriawith substantial stocks of unbacked debt can reverse the “unpleas-
ant arithmetic” of Sargent and Wallace (1981) andWallace (1984), allowing sustained
monetary tightening to produce both ahigher real interest rate anda lowerrate ofin-
flation. Bullard and Russell (1997b) extend this analysis to a multiperiod/calibrated
model and show that in specifications with realistic debt-GDP ratios, moderate de-
creases in the inflation rate can indeed produce significant increases in real interest
rates.
1.2 Monetary steady states in realistic OLG models
In this paper we lay the groundwork for a research program that uses multiperiod
overlapping generations models, parametenized to produce Samuelson-case equilibria,
to study the real effects of monetary and fiscal policy. We do this by demonstrating
2
The literature on endogenous fluctuations in OLG and other models has been surveyed by
Boidrin and Woodford (1990) and Guesnerie and Woodford (1992).
3
See King and Watson (1992), Weber (1994), Bollard and Keating (1995) and Ahmed and Rogers
(1996). There is also a large empirical literature on the Fisher relationship which typically finds
that nominal interest rates rise less than one-for-one with increases in the inflation rate.
2that plausible calibrations of these models can produce steady-state equilibria that
support relatively low real interest rates — rates substantially below the output
growth rate — and large real stocks of unbacked government debt. While we suspect
that many economists who have worked with OLG models have long believed that
they can be extended in the manner we describe, our paper is the first we know of
to demonstrate conclusively that this is the case.
Providing this demonstration requires us to confront a variety of important cal-
ibration issues. A distinguishing feature of OLG models is that the value of almost
every parameter influences whether or not a particular specification has monetary
steady states. As a result, monetary steady states have sometimes been described as
“fragile.” This being the case, we think it is essential to establish that it is possible
to obtain monetary steady states without choosing parameter values that are outside
the range of published estimates, and that the existence of these steady states is
robust to fairly large changes in the values of these parameters. It also seems im-
portant to identify the parameters that are critical in the sense that changes in their
values that would leave them well inside the range of empirical estimates might rule
out monetary steady states.
1.3 Empirical puzzles
In addition to demonstrating the empirical plausibilty of Samuelson-case equilibria
and monetary steady states, our model can help provide explanations for several
empirical phenomena that have proved challenging for other calibrated models.
1.3.1 Real interest rates
One empirical regularity that has emerged as quite puzzling is the relatively low
level of real interest rates on risk-free securities. In the United States, the before-tax
es post real interest rate on short-term government debt averaged a bit less than
one percent during the postwar period, while the average after-tax rate real rate
was slightly below zero percent. (The after-tax real interest rate is the appropriate
empirical analogue of the real interest rate facing savers in a formal model.) During
the same period the average annual growth rate of real GDP was more than three
percent. The same relationship between the risk-free real interest rate and the real
growth rate seems to have prevailed in other times and places — in the U.S. and
U.K. for at least the last century, for example, and in western Europe and Japan
during the postwar period.4
4
For the U.S., Mehra and Prescott (1985) find that during 1889-1978 the average U.S. risk-free
real interest rate was 0.8 percent, before taxes. They also report that U.S. per capita consumption
grew atan average rate of1.8 percent duringthis period. Given the average population growth rate,
the implied growth rate oftotal consumption is approximately 3 percent — a figure consistent with
real growth rate estimates from other sources. Siegel (1992) finds that the average risk-free real rate
in the U.K. duringthis period was slightly lowerthan the average U.S. rate. Barro (1990) uses data
on short-term interest rates in nine OECD countries, including the U.S., Canada, Japan and most
ofthe major Western European economies, to construct a GDP-weighted “world real interest rate”
3Explaining risk-free rates this low has been a serious problem for macroecono-
mists. Nonstochastic versions of standard representative-agent infinite-horizonsmod-
els do not have steady states in which the real interest rate is lower than the output
growth rate. In stochastic versions of these models it is possible for agents’ aversion
to risk to drive the real interest rate on risk-free assets below the output growth rate.
However, Kocherlakota’s (1996) recent survey of the “risk-free rate” literature indi-
cates that in plausibly calibrated specifications investigators can produce safe real
rates low enough to match targets drawnfrom the data only by assuming either that
agents are extremely risk averse or that there are very serious imperfections in the
credit and insurance markets.5 In most cases, moreover, achieving a realistically low
mean for the risk-freerate requires accepting an unrealistically high variance.6
Calibrated versions of overlapping generations models are usually nonstochastic
and are virtually always parameterized to produce classical-case equilibria. As a
result, the real interest rates they produce are higher than the output growth rate
— usually, substantially higher. For example, the model employed by Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987) has an output growth rate of one percent and a real interest rate
of 6.7 percent. In the baseline calibration of our model, however, the output growth
rate is 3.2 percent and the steady-state real interest rate is zero percent.7
for 1959-1988. The average ax post world real rate for this period was 1.7 percent, before taxes.
5
Recent work on this subject includes Dfaz-Giménez and Prescott (1997) who construct an
infinite horizon model with both aggregate and idiosyncratic production shocks and close down
all private insurance markets. Their baseline calibration produces a steady state with a risk-free
real interest rate of zero percent. However, the model does not include population or productivity
growth, which tend to drive the risk-free rate upward (see note 6 below). It also abstracts from
physical capital, which has been shown to be a powerful tool allowing agents to self-insure against
risk. Aiyagari and McGrattan (1995), for example, use a model that includes physical capital to
study the optimum quantity ofgovernment debt. They subject their agents to idiosyncratic earnings
risk and close down private insurance markets. They findthat government debt can provide auseful
supplement to physical capital as an insurance device and that the optimal debt-output ratio may
have been close to the U.S. postwar average. However, the welfare gains from government debt are
quite small, and their real interest rate of4.5 percent substantially exceeds their output growth rate
of 1.85 percent.
6
Models in the risk-free rate literature typically abstract from population growth, while models
in the saving rate and related literatures (see below) typically abstract from productivity growth.
Thus, both literatures underestimate the difficulty of duplicating the observed difference between
the risk-free rate andthe real growth rate. In addition, most papers in these literatures use observed
before-tax real rates astheir targets or reference standards, although in models without return taxes
the appropriate targets are after-tax rates (see above). Innonstochastic representative agent models
it is the after-tax real interest rate that is bounded below by the output growth rate.
7
There has been a limited amount of work with stochastic general equilibrium versions of cal-
ibrated multi-period Diamond models. RIos-Rull (1994) introduces aggregate production risk in
order to study the business cycle characteristics of life cycle models. His baseline steady state pro-
duces a risk-free real interest rates close to 6 percent, whether or not he closes down contingent
claims markets. Imrohoro~luat al. (1995) study the welfare effects of social security in a model
that includes idiosyncratic mortality and employment risk and closes down the annuities and in-
surance markets. Their baseline steady state produces a real interest rate of 0.4 percent, which is
low in an absolute sense but is only 0.8 percent lower than their real growth rate of 1.2 percent.
Interestingly, they find that there are substantial welfare benefits from pay-as-you-go social security
schemes. There is no productivity growth in their baseline calibration. Their alternative case that
does include productivity growth produces a real interest rate that exceeds the output growth rate
4Empirical estimates of the average real rate of return on capital are almost al-
ways higher than the average output growth rate. As a result, researchers using
nonstochastic models with a single real interest rate must make a nontrivial choice
about which real return rate to target. In our view, the principal contribution of
our analysis is to demonstrate the viability of a modeling strategy that targets the
observed average risk-free rate rather than the observed average risky return rate.
We show in Section 4.1, however, that our results are robust to the introduction of
frictions that drive the marginal product of capital above the output growth rate, as
long as we keep the rates of return facing households and the government close to
the observed risk-free realrate.
1.3.2 Saving and lifetime consumption
Calibrated versions of overlapping modelshavehadsome difficulty producingrealistic
levels of saving and wealth relative to income. This situation has produced an ex-
tensive literature that attempts to augment the models in ways that might increase
agents’ saving rates. The largest branch of this literature introduces a variety of
stochastic features — supplemented, in most cases, by incomplete credit/insurance
markets — in order to induce precautionary savings. Alternative strategies for in-
creasing saving and wealth involve the introduction of liquidity constraints, bequests
and related motives, and human capital. Our findings suggest that reparameterizing
the standard nonstochastic OLG model to support Samuelson-case equilibria may
solve the saving and wealth problem, making more radical respeciflcations unnec-
essary for this purpose. In our baseline steady state both the saving rate and the
wealth-output ratio come quite close to matching estimates based on postwar-U.S.
data.
A related problem with standard calibrated life cycle models is that the level of
a household’s consumption tends to increase close to linearly with the age of the
household. Observed age-consumption profiles, in contrast, are hump-shaped, peak-
ingin late middle ageand declining fairly rapidly thereafter. A numberof researchers
haveasserted that nonstochastic modelscannot generate realistically humped-shaped
profiles. In our model, however, the combination of low real interest rates and en-
dogenous labor supply produces age-consumption profiles with empirically plausible
humps.
1.3.3 Public debt
At the end of the Second World War the U.S. national debt exceeded annual U.S.
output. During the ensuing half-century the federal government did not run large
primary surpluses for any extended period, and on average its budget was balanced:
during 1948-1994, the average annual net-of-interest surplus amounted to 0.0 percent
and eliminates the welfare gains from social security.
5of GDP. Thus, it is essentially accurate to describe the entire World War II debt as
having been rolled over for the last 50 years. Despite the absence of significant debt
retirement, in 1994 the U.S. debt-GDP ratio was less than two-thirds the size of the
ratio in 1948.
In nonstochastic versions ofstandard representative agent models, or overlapping
generations models calibrated to produce classical-case equilibria, it is impossible
for the government to roll over a large debt without running substantial net-of-
interest surpluses on average. In stochastic versions of these models maintaining
large permanent debts without running average surpluses is theoretically possible,
but quite difficult in practice — more difficult, broadly speaking, than producing
equilibria with relatively low real interest rates.8 In the baseline steady state of our
nonstochastic model, however, the debt-output ratio is equal to the U.S. postwar
average and the government finances a small primary deficit by rolling this debt over
each period.
1.4 Outline
In the Section 2 of this paper we lay out the model that will provide the basis for
much of our analysis, and we derive and discuss the conditions for the existence of
monetary steady states. In the third section we calibrate the model and compute
its steady-state equilibria. We describe the characteristics of these equilibria and
compare them to various features of U.S. postwar data. We also investigate of the
sensitivity of our results to changes in the model’s parameters.
In Section 4w einvestigate the sensitivity of our results to the introduction of
simple credit market frictions that drive the marginal product of capital above the
govenment bond rate. We also discuss two issues that are raised by our analysis:




We begin by assuming that time is infinite inboth directions, with economicactivity
occurring at discrete dates t = ... —1, 0, 1 A finite number of agents are born at
each date t; each of these “members of generation t” lives for n periods. Members
of a particular generation are identical, and members of different generations are
identical except for their birthdates. We assume that the number of agents in each
generation grows at gross rate ~ 1 per period, so that the total population grows
at the same rate. The population of generation 1 is normalized to unity.
There is a single good in the model. This good can be consumed or used as an
8
See Bohn (1993).
6input in production, in which case it is called capital. Capital produced during a
period cannot be used in production until the following period, at which point it
begins to depreciate at a net rate of 8 ~ [0, 1] per period. The production process is
standard Cobb-Douglas, with exogenous technological progress:
Y(t) = F~(K(t), L(t)) = )~(t_l)(l_a)K(t)aL(t)l~.u. (1)
Here Y(t) is aggregate output at date t, and ~\~ 1 is the gross rate of technolog-
ical progress. Aggregate employment of effective labor is denoted L(t), and K(t)
represents the amount of capital used in production at date t. We will use k(t)
K(t)/L(t) to denote the ratio of capital to effective labor. The parameter a e [0, 1]
determines the capital share of output.
The production technology is available to an arbitrary number of perfectly com-
petitive firms; in equilibrium, each of these firms earns zero profits at each date. The
firms rent capital and hire effective labor from agents at rental and wage rates that
are equal, in equilibrium, to the marginal products of the respective inputs. Thus
the real rental rate on capital is r(t) = A(t1)(1~) ak(t)’~’,while the real wage is
w(t) = ~(t—1)(1—c~)(1 — a)k(t)°.
Each member of generation t is endowed with £ units of time per period of life.
Each period, agents divide their total time endowment between time spent enjoying
leisure and time spent supplying labor. The portion of the time endowment that a
member of generation t allocates to leisure at date t+j is denoted£~ (t+j), j = 0,
n—i, so that l~(t+j) 1 — £~(t+j)is the amount of time allocated to supplying
labor. The productivity of an agent in the ~jth period of life is denoted e~,i =
1, ..., n. These productivity endowments are intended to represent the amounts
of fully-internalized human capital that agents have accumulated during their lives.
The amount of effective labor an agent supplies at date t is the product of the
amount of time allocated to labor and the value of the productivity endowment at
that date, given the agent’s age. At date t+j, the income of a member of generation
t is the product of the real wage at that date and his supply of effective labor:
w(t+j) e~+ilt(t+j),j = 0, ... ,n—i.
There is a government that endures forever. The only role of the government
is to collect real revenue by issuing unbacked liabilities and exchanging them for
consumption goods. After it has been collected, government revenue disappears
from the model. Its value at date t is
c t — H(t) — H(t—i) 2 P(t) ‘~
where H(t) represents the nominal stock of unbacked liabilities outstanding at the
end of date t, and P(t) represents the date t price of a unit of the consumption
good in units of these liabilities. The government is assumed to issue unbacked
7liabilities so that their nominal stock grows at a constant rate 9 ~ 1; that is, H(t) =
9H(t—i). Thus, when 9 = i the nominal stock of unbacked liabilities is constant,
and government revenue is zero at each date.
We will let st(t+j — i) denote the total real quantity of assets held by a member
of generation t at the end of his j~~’ period of life. There are three types of assets
available to agents: one-period consumption loans, unbacked government liabilities,
and physical capital. The gross real rate of return on consumption loans extended
at date t is denoted R(t), and the rate on unbacked liabilities purchased at date t
is P(t)/P(t+1). Capital purchased at date t can be carried into date t+i, rented
to firms, and then sold, net of depreciation; in equilibrium, the resulting gross rate
of return is i + r(t+i) — 6. The possibility of arbitrage implies that in any perfect-
foresight competitive equilibrium where agents purchase positive amounts of physical
capital and government liabilities, we will have P(t)/P(t+i) = R(t) = r(t+i) + (i —
6).
We assume agents have perfect foresight regarding future interest and wage rates.
Under this assumption, the budget constraints facing a member of generation t can
be written
ct(t) + st(t) = w(t) eilt (t) (3)
ct(t+j) +st(t+j) = w(t+j) e~+ilt(t+j)+ R(t+j—1) s~(t+j—i) (4)
for j = i, ... , n-2, and
ct(t+n—i) = w(t+n—i) e~lt(t-j--n—i)+R(t+n—i) st(t+n—1) (5)
where ct(t+j) 0, j = 0, ..., n-i, and 0 ~ l~(t+j)~ 1, j = 0, ..., n-i. The first
three constraints can be combined as follows:
ct(t) + ~ ct(t+i) ~ <w(t) eilt(t) + ~ w(t+i) e~+ilt(t+i)flR(t+i)~1.
(6)
Agents choose quantities of consumption and leisure at each date in order to
maximize
U = u (ct(t+i), £~(t+i)), (7)
where
1 (8)
subject to the above constraints. We assume ‘y > 0, ~j E [0, i], and ~ > 0. The
parameter ‘y governs the curvature of the period utility function for consumption
and leisure and the parameter ~ governs the willingness of an agent to substitute
current leisure for current consumption.
8The parameter ~3is a time discount factor, and can be defined as i/ (i + p),
where p > —i is agents’ pure rate of time preference. The parameters p and ~
interact to determine agents’ willingness to defer consumption. An alternative time-
preference measure that captures this interaction is
(9)
To understand the meaning of this measure, imagine an agent who has a constant
(flat) pattern of efficiency endowments, receives a constant real wage, and is con-
fronted by a net real interest rate of zero. If this agent has negative time preference,
he will choose a consumption bundle in which his consumption grows at a positive
rate from the first period to the second period, and vice-versa. The effective time-
preference rate ~i sthe opposite of this desired consumption growth rate.
2.2 Steady-state equilibria
The aggregate net real end-of-period asset holdings of the members of the n genera-
tions that are alive at date t are denoted
A(t) = ~t~s~_~(t). (10)
If no agent chooses to retire (provide zero units of labor time) at any date, both
aggregate asset demand at date t and the aggregate supply of effective labor at that
date can be expressed as functions of the R(t+i), i = 2—n, ..., n—2. This can
be accomplished by solving the maximization problem just described, assuming an
interior optimum, and using the fact that the generations are identical except for
birthdates and population size. While we assume there is an interior optimum for
the purposes of the present discussion, when we compute equilibria numerically we
will always take account of retirement possibilities.
Dynamic paths for this economy can be characterized by two equations:
H(t)/P(t) = A(t) — K(t+i) (ii)
H(t) = 9H(t—i). (i2)
Equilibrium paths can consequently be described as solutions to
A(t) — K(t+i) = 9R(t—i) [A(t—i) — K(t)] . (i3)
This condition requires that the aggregate real supply of unbacked liabilites at date
t, which consists of the ex post real value of the liabilities agents purchased at date
t—i plus the real value of the new liabilities issued by the government, must equal
the aggregate real demand for liabilities at date t. It also imposes perfect foresight,
in that the ex post value of the liabilities agents purchased at date t—i is equal to
9the value the agents expected at that date. Given the other equilibrium conditions,
and the perfect foresight requirement, condition (1) ensures that the goods market
clears at each date.
Because K(t) = k(t)L(t), where k(t) can be written as a function of the real
interest rate at date t—i, condition (i) can be expressed as a univariate nonlinear
difference equation in the real interest rate. Stationary solutions can be found by
imposing R(t) = R Vt. In a stationary equilibrium, both aggregate savings and the
aggregate capital stock grow at gross rate A~.Thus equilibria occur at values of R
such that A(i) — .X~K(i)= 0, where A(t) = ~t_lA(i) and K(t) = ~X~,)t_lK(i).
An equilibrium at a value of R that produces A(i) — A~K(i) = 0 will be called
a nonmonetary steady state, and the equilibrium gross real rate of interest will be
denoted ~ Unbacked liabilities are not held in steady states of this type. There
is also a monetary steady state at R = X~L’9~, provided A(i) — A~K(i)is positive
at this value of R. We will call a steady state of this type a monetary steady state,
and the associated gross realinterest rate will be denoted Rmss. In this steady state,
unbacked liabilities are held and valued, and their real stock grows at gross rate .~b
per period.
Forthe purpose of characterizing the steady states that can arise in a particular
specification of the model, it is useful to define an aggregate asset-demand function
that presumes that the real interest rate is date-invariant, and nets out assets that
represent holdings of physical capital. We will refer to this function as the “aggregate
savings function,” because it plays the same role in our analysis of this model that
the aggregate savings function plays in the analysis ofa two-period OLG model. The
date-i aggregate savings function is
S1[R] A(i)[R] — K(2)[R] (i4)
and the date-j function is S~[R] = ~i’S1[R]. The condition
A(i) — X~K(i)In=~> 0, (15)
which can be rewritten as S1[)~L]> 0, is necessary and sufficient for the existence of
a monetary steady state in this model.
While it is possible for a specification of the model to have many nonmonetary
steady states, in the calibrated specifications we study the aggregate savings function
is strictly increasing in R, and there is consequently only one equilibrium ofthis type.
For the moment, we will focus on monetary steady states in which the nominal stock
of unbacked liabilities is constant (9 = i), so that Rmss = .)c~. As long as the
aggregate savings function is increasing, the existence of such a monetary steady
state is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of monetary steady
states in which 9> 1. In particular, if there is a monetary steady state when 9 = i,
iothen there will also be a monetary steady state associated with each 9 E (1, O), where
9 solves Rnmss =
3 Monetary steady states
3.1 Calibration
Our analysis of the model centers around a baseline case in which we choose empiri-
cally plausible values for each of the model’s parameters and compute the resulting
monetary steady state.
The value of n controls the number of periods in an agent’s life. We follow
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) by setting n = 55 for most of our analysis and by
thinking of a single period as a year. Wethink of the first period of an agent’s life as
corresponding to the first year of a person’s working life — roughly age 21, so that
the last year of an agent’s life corresponds to age 75. There is no uncertainty about
this terminal age. We adopt an interpretation of a “period” under which changing
the value of n does not change the length of an agent’s life: instead, it changes the
number of periods into which a life of fixed real-time length is divided. When we
change the value of n we adjust the values of a number of other parameters so that
their annualized values remain constant. One consequence of this interpretation is
that the steady-state values of the endogenous variables are essentially invariant to
our choice of n, once n is large enough to make our discrete-time model reasonably
good approximation of a continuous-time model. (See Section 3.3.1 below.)
The preference parameter ~qcontrols the willingness of agents to substitute con-
sumption for leisure by supplying labor, and thus controls the elasticity of their labor
supply. In addition, there is a close but not exact correspondence between the value
ofi~andthe average share of an agent’s time endowment that is devoted to supplying
labor. On the basis of this correspondence we set ~ to 0.22. This setting comes close
to producing our estimate of the average fraction of the year that a full-time worker
devotes to labor, which is 0.229. We obtain this estimate by subtracting weekends,
holidays and two five-day weeks of vacation from the total number of days in a cal-
endar year, dividing by three to represent an eight-hour working day, and dividing
the result by the number of days in a year.10 In the baseline case, we do not force
agents to retire at any age, though they may choose to retire voluntarily.
As we have noted, thevalue of~ydetermines the curvature of agents’ period utility
9
1n Section 3.3 we use the test Rnmss < .X~’to determine whether or not there is a monetary
steady state. When the aggregate savings function is upward-sloping, this test is equivalent to
condition (15).
‘°Thestandard value for 7) in the calibration literature is 1/3, which is based on a 14 hour day.
However, utility functions like ours imply that the marginal disutility from working all available
hours is minus infinity. Since some people do work 14 or more hours per day, we think an interpre-
tation based on a 24 hour day is more defensible. Our calculation also assumes a 100 percent labor
force participation rate. If we used a more realistic 65 percent participation rate our agents would
devote only 14.8 percent of their available time to work.
iifunction u(c,£). This parameter consequently influences the willingness of agents to
substitute consumption (or leisure) acrossperiods in response to changes in the real
rate of interest: a [1 — ?7(i — -y)]~i s the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
in consumption. In recent years, the value of this elasticity has been the subject of
a large empirical literature. The only consensus this literature has reached is that a
is probably between zero and unity. In the absence of such a consensus we choose a
baseline-case value for -y which, when combined with our other baseline parameter
choices, produces an unbacked-debt-to-GDP ratio that matches the postwar average.
The choice for -y produced by this procedure is 4.2. Given our baseline choice of
~, this 7-value produces a consumption-substitution elasticity of approximately 0.59.
This value is quite close to arecent a-estimate by Attanasio andWeber (1995). These
authors, who identify andaddress a number ofproblems with earlier estimates, obtain
an estimate of 0.56.
The question of empirically appropriate assumptions about time preference is
also quite unsettled. Our choice for p is based on Hurd (1989), who estimates the
differencebetween the risk-freerealrate of return facingagents and their purerate of
time preference. His favored estimate of this parameter is 0.041. Because our target
for the average after-tax, risk-free real interest rate in the postwar U.S. is zero, we
have chosen p = —0.041 in our baseline case.11 Given our choice of -y, this choice
yields an effective time preference rate of —0.01. The value of p must be also be
adjusted for the choice of n; this is done by raising the associated discount factor /3
to the power 55/n, and using the reconversion formula p = (1 — /3)//3.
The efficiency-endowment patternwe employ is based on estimates of productivity
by age reported by Hansen (1993). The underlying pattern isa weighted average of
Hansen’s estimated patterns for men and women; we smooth it by fitting a second-
degree polynomial. The smoothed pattern is
e(j) = exp [—1.46+ 0.070731 i — 0.00075 j2] (16)
j 21,22, ... , 76. We construct the endowment patterns used in the model for
alternative values of n by dividing the interval [21, 76] into n subintervals of equal
length, and setting e~, the endowment received in the ~ period of life, equal to the
integral of this endowment function over the ~ subinterval.
The parameter a determines the share of gross output that is paid out in the
form of returns to capital. We follow Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and many
subsequent studies by choosing a value of 0.25. The appropriate value of a depends,
to some extent, on the breadth of the modelers’ empirical definitions of “capital” and
“labor,” and on the extent to which they believe that other forms of capital (such
as government physical capital, R&D capital, and uninternalized human capital) are
“For adiscussion ofthe empirical plausibility of negative time preference see section 3,3.4 below.
12substitutes for private tangible capital. The gross population growth rate ~i sset at
i.0i7, which is the average U.S. labor force growth rate during the postwar period.
The gross rate of technological progress A is setequal to 1.015; this produces a steady-
state net output growth rate of 3.2 percent, the postwar average. Ifwe use adifferent
value for n, these parameters are adjusted by raising them to the power 55/n. The
net depreciation rate 6 is set at 0.1. Values of 6 must also be adjusted for n; if we
denote the annual depreciation rate 6, the adjustment is 6(n) = 1 — (1 — 8)~~1°.
The remaining parameter is 8, the gross rate at which the government increases
the nominal stock of unbacked liabilities. We have set the baseline net growth rate of
the nominal stock ofunbacked debt at 3.2 percent (9 = 1.032), avalue that produces
a net real interest rate of zero in the monetary steady state. The value of 9 can
also be adjusted for different choices of n by raising it to the power 55/n. We chose
zero as a target risk-freeinterest rate based on U.S. postwar data. The most widely-
used empirical proxy for the risk-free real interest rate is the ex post real yield on a
three-month Treasury bills. Our estimate of the average value of this yield during
1948-1994 is 1.0 percent. Weestimate the average after-tax safe realrate by applying
an estimate of the average marginal tax rate on interest income for each quarter to
the net nominal yield for that quarter.12 This procedure produces an average rate
of —0.4 percent. For the purpose of contructing our baseline case we rounded this
estimate up to zero percent.
3.2 Features of the baseline steady state
Under our baseline calibration the aggregate saving function, which was defined in
equation (14), is strictly increasing in the gross real interest rate R. This finding
is robust to parameter changes of the types described in the next subsection. The
saving function is negative at low values of R and is positive at higher values. There
is consequentlya unique nonmonetary steady state at which the value of thefunction
is zero. The associated gross real interest rate Rumss 0.996 is lower than the gross
output growth rate ~A 1.032. As a result, for each 8 E [1, ~AR~55) there is a
unique monetary steady state involving R,7~
= ~/iA01. In our baseline monetary
steady state we set 9 = ~A, which produces Rmss i.
3.2.1 Real interest rates and debt
Perhaps the single most striking feature of our baseline steady state, other than the
fact that it is a monetary steady state, is that the equilibrium real interest rate
is more than three percent lower the equilibrium output growth rate. As we have
noted, the steady-state values of the real interest rate and the output growth rate
are close to our estimates of the average after-tax real interest rate on risk-free credit
‘
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We thank Professor Joseph Peek of Boston College for providing us with marginal tax rate
estimates.
13instruments and the average real GDP growth rate, respectively, in the U.S. during
the postwar period. To the best of our knowledge, no other plausibly calibrated
general equilibrium model has produced this combination of steady-state values.
Another unique feature of our baseline steady state is that the ratio of the stock
of unbacked liabilities to output is 0.59, which is our estimate of the average ratio
of the U.S. national debt to GDP during the period i948-i994.’~ Our figure for
the national debt is federal debt held by the public, including the social security
system, plus base money outstanding. (The latter is essentially equal to federal debt
held by the Federal Reserve Banks.) Our use of this figure reflects our maintained
assumption that the entire national debt has been and remains unbacked, both in
reality and in the expectations of U.S. households. While we could not claim to be
able to prove that this assumption is correct, it is quite consistent with the facts
about the history of the debt that we presented in our introduction. In our baseline
steady state, the government uses bond seigniorage revenue to finance a permanent
net-of-interest deficit that amounts to 1.9 percent of annual output.’4
3.2.2 Consumption and labor supply
Our baseline steady state produces reasonable labor supply behavior on the part of
the households. As we have indicated, households devote an average of about 22
percent of their time to supplying labor. Although they retire (supply zero labor)
only in their final period of life, they are semi-retired during the last fifth of their
lives, working only 7.6 percent ofthe time. Over the first four-fifths oftheir lifetimes,
in contrast, they work for an average of 30 percent of the available hours.
An important difference betweenoverlapping-generations and infinite-horizon mod-
els is that in OLG models agents’ lifetime consumption growth rates can be quite
different from the growth rate of aggregate per capita consumption, even when all
agents are identical within and across generations. Laitner (1992) notes that the
empirical evidence supports approximate equality between the lifetime consumption
growth rate and the aggregate growth rate ofper capita consumption. In many cali-
brated OLG models, however, the high real interest rates facing households produce
consumption growth rates well in excess of the average per capita growth rate, Auer-
bach and Kotlikoff, for example, obtain an average lifetime consumption growth rate
of roughly 2.5 percent in a model with a per capita consumption growth rate of zero
percent. In our baseline steady state, however, the average lifetime consumption
consumption of 1.8 percent is quite close to the per capita consumption growth rate
t3
There is a sense in which this is true by construction, since we choose ‘y in order to reproduce
this ratio. However, our baseline parameterization is unique in allowing us to this while keeping ci in
the middle ofthe empirically plausible range. In other calibrated models, reproducing the observed
bonds-output ratio would either be impossible or would require values ofa well in excess of unity.
‘
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Bond seigniorage, which is conceptually similar to currency seigniorage, is the revenue the
government can earn from maintaining a real stock of outstanding debt when the real interest rate
on its bonds is lower than the output growth rate. See Miller and Sargent (1984).
i4of 1.5 percent. (The latter is necessarily equal to the exogenous productivity growth
rate.)
Evidence from cross-sectional surveys of consumption behavior suggests that pro-
files of consumption by age are humped-shaped. The consumption of middle-aged
households is substantially higher than that of young households, and after late mid-
dle agethe consumption of older people begins to decrease relative to that of their
middle-aged contemporaries. However, conventional nonstochastic life-cycle models,
such as the Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1987) model, produce age-consumption profiles that
are close to linear. Engen (1992) argues that nonstochastic models are incapable of
producing humped-shaped age-consumption profiles.
Our baseline steady state produces a humped shape age-consumption profile.
Consumptionishighest among individuals who are roughly 50 years ofage; their con-
sumption is approximately 50 percent higher than the consumption of the youngest
agents (age 21) and 25 percent higher than the consumption of the oldest ones (age
75). This proffle is quite similar to the age-consumption profiles obtained by Engen
(1992) in a model that includes both mortality risk and earnings uncertainty. Both
these model-generated profiles are broadly similar to the empirical consumptionpro-
file Engen constructs using data from the Consumer Expenditures Survey.15 The
empirical profile peaks at about the same age but has a more dramatic hump: peak
middle-age consumption is roughly 1.7 times higher than the consumption of new
labor force entrants, and the consumption of 75-year-olds is about equal to that of
2i-year-olds.
The source of our hump-shaped consumption profile is a combination of three
features ofour model: a humped-shaped labor-efficiency profile, elastic labor supply,
and low real interest rates. The first feature makes the opportunity cost of labor
relatively highlater inlife, the second featureallows agents to respond by substituting
into leisure, andthe third feature allows substitution into leisure to produce a decline
in consumption.16
3.2.3 Saving and wealth
As we noted in the introduction, calibrated versions of nonstochastic OLG models
have had difficulty generating enough savings to match empirical estimates of saving
rates and wealth-output ratios. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), for example, obtain a
steady-state saving rate of3.7 percent. In our baseline case, however, the saving rate
is approximately 8.1 percent. This is actually a bit higher than our estimate of the
‘
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Engen’s empirical profile is quite similar to the profile constructed by Attanasio and Weber
(1995). It is important to notethat in agrowing economy the age-consumption profile at aparticular
date can look quite different from a time series of a household’s consumption over its lifetime.
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In a model without endogenous labor supply the age-consumption profile is necessarily linear.
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) have endogenous labor supply and a humped-shaped labor efficiency
profile. They obtain a nearly-linear age-consumption profile because oftheir high real interest rate.
15U.S. saving rate (the ratio of private savingless depreciation to GDP), which averaged
of 7.2 percent during 1948-1994. Technological progress, which is absent from the
Auerbach-Kotlikoff model and many other models in the saving-rate literature, plays
an important role in generating high saving rates in our model.’7
Our baseline steady state produces a wealth-output ratio of 3.1. Laitner (1992)
presents evidencesupporting a target value of 3.15 for the ratio ofaggregate wealth to
GDP. His calculation includes the market value of government debt, which does not
appear in most other wealth-output calculations but is an important component of
total wealth in our model. Laitner goes on to conduct a partial equilibrium analysis
in which he varies the exogenous real interest rate. Hisnonstochastic model cannot
generate plausible wealth-income ratios unless it is augmented by bequest motives
and/or liquidity constraints and unless the real interest rate is at least as high as the
output growth rate.
Our baseline case produces a lifetime wealth profile similar to the proffles pro-
duced by other nonstochastic life-cycle models. Young households accumulate assets
fairly rapidly, especially in early middle age, and then draw down these assets even
more rapidly starting around age 60. Studies based on cross-section evidence have
often found that the elderly continue to accumulate assets until the end of their lives
— a finding that has stimulated interest in models with bequest motives. However,
theoretical analysis conducted by Hurd (1987,1989) indicates that most elderly peo-
ple should have declining wealth trajectories even with a bequest motive. Hurd’s
empirical analysis indicates that most elderly people do dissave fairly rapidily as
they age, and he finds little or no evidence of bequest motives.18 (For additional
discussion of bequest and related motives see Section 4.3 below.)
The capital-output ratio in the baseline steady state is 2.5, which is a standard
figure in the literature on calibrated general equilibrium models. The range of values
in the literature is quite broad, although values lower than 2 or higher than 3.5 are
unusual. Prescott (1986) advocates a target capital-output ratio of 2.6.19
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There is a large literature that attempts to explain saving rates by introducing stochastic fea-
tures that induce precautionary saving. Most ofthis literature uses partial equilibrium models with
real interest rates that are exogenous and relatively high: examples include Engen (1992) and Hub-
bard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994). Recent work by Rangazas and Lord (1998) indicates that general




Hurd (1987) provides brief survey ofprevious empirical evidence for and against the proposition
that the elderly tend to dissave as they age.
‘°Morerecent work by Cooley and Prescott (1995) identifies the target ratio as 3.3. The target
ratio increased because they broadened their empirical definition of capital stock to include both
government capital and consumer durables.
163.3 Robustness of monetary steady states
3.3.1 Overview
In this subsectionwe report the results ofsome simple experiments inwhich we vary a
singleparameter acrossa range of alternative values, holding all the other parameters
at their baseline values (except 8, which is not relevant for this purpose). Wecompute
the associated value of the nonmonetary steady state gross real interest rate Rnmss
andcompare this value to the associated value of the gross output growthrate (which
changes only when we change ~o rA — see below). In each set of experiments, it
turns out that Rnmss increases or decreases monotonically with the value of the
parameter in question. In each case but the first (which involves changing the value
of n), moreover, the relationship is close to linear.
We begin by investigating how the “annualized” value of the nonmonetary gross
real interest rate Ramss — that is, the raw value raised to the power n/55 — de-
pends on the value of n, the number of periods in agents’ lives, as n is varied from
2 to 220. The annualized nonmonetary real rate starts out fairly high and declines
rapidly at first, but settles down to a long, slow and apparently asymptotic decline
after n reaches 10-15 periods. The nonmonetary rate is always below the annualized
output growth rate ~A. Thus, in our baseline case there are monetary steady states
regardless of the value of n, and for reasonably large values the properties of these
steady states are essentially invariant to n. However, these results suggest that the
properties of small-n specifications are not a reliable guide to the properties of spec-
ifications in which n is fairly large. When n = 2, for example, the annualized gross
real interest rate in the nonmonetary steady state is 1.03, which is only 0.2 percent
lower than the annualized output growth rate. The corresponding value for our base-
line case (in which n = 55) is 0.996. Thus, the n = 2 specification has monetary
states only for values of 0 quite close to unity and cannot deliver annualized real
interest rates substantially below the real growth rate. These experiments indicate
that calibration exercises using small-n OLG modelsmay produce misleading results.
The rest of this section reports the results of calibration experiments in which n
is fixed at 55.
3.3.2 Critical parameters
Rate of time preference. The nonmonetary real interest rate increases with the
pure rate of time preference. In the baseline case, values of p in excess of —0.006
fail to produce monetary steady states. Given our baseline choice of ‘q, a pure time
preference rate of —0.006 yields an effective time preference rate of —0.001. Thus, it
is essentially accurate to describe our baseline specification as one in which monetary
steady states exist if and only if the time preference rate is negative. It is important
to note, however, that the findingthat positive time preference rates do not support
17monetary steady states is not a general implication of our model: it is simply a
characteristic of our baseline parameterization. If we were to reduce our baseline
value of -y to unity — a value often used in real-business-cycle studies — then there
would be monetary steady states for values of p as high as +0.012. However, the
pure time preference rate is the clearest example of a parameter that is critical in
the sense that many values which are widely regarded as empirically plausible rule
out monetary steady states.
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. The nonmonetary
real rate also increases in the value of -y, a parameter which controls resistance to
intertemporal substitution. Monetary steady states do not exist for 7-values higher
than 10, which correspond to a substitution elasticities lower than 1/3. The results
of this experiment may be somewhat misleading, however. As we noted in section
2.1, increasing 7 without adjusting p produces agents who are also very resistant to
deferring consumption. If we modify the above experiment by adjusting pin order to
keep the effectivetime preference rate ~ fixed at its baseline value of —1 percent, then
it turns out that Ramss is no longer increasing in . For example, ifwe choose = 42,
which produces a = 0.1, then there is still a monetary steady at R = 1, and in order
to preserve the baseline debt-GDP ratio we must actually reduce ~ slightly (to —0.8
percent). The associated value of p is —0.28. While this value may seem low, there is
nothing implausible about theway theseagents value current vs. future consumption:
their average lifetime consumption growth rate remains 1.8 percent.
3.3.3 Other parameters
Productivity and technology growth rates. The nonmonetary steady-state
real interest rate increases with the rate of technological progress. However, increas-
ing A also increases the steady-state output growth rate — a fact that broadens the
range of A-values consistent with the existence of monetary steady states. There are
monetary steady states for any rate of technological progress lower than 7.2 percent.
Increasing the gross population growth rate ~ also increases both the output growth
rate and value of Rumss. In this case, however, the interest rate rises more slowly
than the growth rate, so that the range of values of 0 consistent with the existence
of a monetary steady state broadens markedly as ~ increases. Reducing ~ has the
opposite effect, but it is not very pronounced. When ~i s reduced to unity (a con-
stant population), for example, Rnmss falls to 0.994 and remains substantially below
the implied gross output growth rate of 1.015.
Capital share ofoutput and labor share oftime. Increases in the value of the
capital share parameter a tends to increase Rnmss, but the gradient is relatively low.
A capital share of 0.5, which is twice the baseline value, produces Rumss = 1.023.
Since the baseline gross output growth rate is 1.032, this capital share still leaves
18scope for monetary steady states. Increasing ~, the labor share of time, has similar
effects. An ~j of 0.5, which is more than twice the baseline value, also produces
Rnmss = 1.023.
Depreciation rate. Reducing the depreciation rate tends to increase the real in-
terest rate in the nonmonetary steady state. However, unless the value of 6 is quite
close to zero — less than 0.002 — Rnmss continues to fall short of the gross output
growth rate.
Age of forced retirement. In our baseline case agents work relatively little in
the last ten years of life but retire completely onlyin their very last period. The date
of retirement is fairly sensitive to the interest rate the agent faces in the monetary
steady state. If we choose 0 = 1 in our baseline case, so that thenet real interest rate
in the monetary steady state rises from zero to 3.2 percent, then agents retire during
the last ii periods of life. We also conducted experiments in which we imposed
retirement beginning at figurative ages from 62 to 76 so that agents must retire
for 14, 13, ..., 2, 1, 0 years. Reducing the age of forced retirement tends to increase
saving and decrease Rnmss, but the effect is fairly weak. Forced retirement at age 62
decreases Rnmss by only 1.1 percentage points.
Labor-efficiency profile. Finally, we investigate the effects of changing the pat-
tern of labor-efficiency endowments. Generally speaking, steeper patterns (patterns
in which productivity tends to be higher later in life) tend to produce higher non-
monetary real interest rates and vice-versa. Our strategy for constructing afamily of
steeper or flatter patterns starts by defining an augmentation factor f. This factor
will be larger than unity if we want a steeper pattern and between zero and unity if
we want aflatter one. To obtain a revised pattern, we multiply the efficiency endow-
ment in the last period of an agent’s life by the value of the augmentation factor, and
multiply endowments in earlier periods by a number obtained by interpolating lin-
early between unity andf, depending on the current age ofthe agent. Increasing the
steepness of the proffle tends to increase R
7
,~, but the effect is much less dramatic
than we expected. Unless f exceeds 4.3, a value that produces an extremely steep
efficiency profile, there will be monetary steady states for some values of 0. Using
the alternative efficiency-endowment patterns employed by Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987) makes it marginally easier to obtain monetary steady states.
3.3.4 Interpretation
We think the results of these experiments demonstrate that our baseline monetary
steady state is quite robust, in the sensethat most of the parameters of the model can
be varied within broad ranges without ruling out monetary steady states. In most
cases, the ranges in question include the values of most published estimates of the
19respective parameters.2° One noteworthy exception is the rate of time preference.
Unless we are willing to make fairly large changes in the baseline values of other
parameters — such as increasing 7 and/or decreasing ~ in order to increase the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution — we cannot have monetary steady states
with positive rates of time preference.
As Bailey and Olson (1980) point out, nothing in the neoclassical theory of in-
tertemporal consumer choice rules out negative time preference rates. As a result,
the sign of p (or p~)must be regarded as an empirical question. Bailey and Olson
pronounce in favor of positive time preference, arguing that agents with negative
time preference rates would chooseimplausibly high consumption growth rates and
would consequently have implausibly low consumption levels when young. Our re-
sults provide a counterexample to this claim, however. In our baseline steady state
the average lifetime consumption growth rate is only 1.8 percent, and a household’s
consumption in the first period of life is only 25 percent lower than the current level
of average per capita consumption. As we have seen, both values are consistent with
empirical estimates of age-consumption profiles.
A large number of empirical studies have attempted to estimate the parameters
of agents’ utility functions using aggregate time series or pooled cross-sectional and
time series data. Many of these studies have produced negative estimates of the rate
of time preference. Examples include MaCurdy (1981), Hayashi (1982), Hansen and
Singleton (1983), Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985), Eichenbaum, Hansen
and Singleton (1988), Hotz, Kydland and Sedlacek (1988), Hurd (1989), Singleton
(1990) and Epstein and Zin (1991). These estimates all reflect the same basic feature
of the data: the observed real interest rates on risk-free assets (which are low) and
the observed growth rates of individual and/or aggregate consumption (which are
substantially positive) are difficult to reconcile with positive rates oftime preference.
4 Issues
4.1 Credit market frictions and the rate of return on capital
A wealthof empirical evidence indicates that there is alargegap between the average
real interestrate on risk-freegovernment debt, which is relatively low (see above), and
the average realreturn rates on diversified portfolios ofrisky private liabilities, which
are relatively high. The evidence also suggests that the average output growth rate
20
Larch (1993) also investigates the question of whether Auerbach-Kotlikoff-style models can
support nonmonetary steady states in which the real interest rate is lower than the real growth
rate, His model does not include depreciation, endogenous labor supply or realistic labor efficiency
profiles, and he rules out negative time preference rates a priori. As we have seen, all these modeling
decisionstend to work against steady states with relatively low real interest rates. As aresult, Larch
concludes that plausible parameter choices rule out steady states of this type. He does not study
monetary steady states and he does not compare the endogenous features of the steady states his
model generates to the characteristics of actual economies.
20lies between these two average realreturn rates. The source of this “equity premium”
is one of the most profoundly unsettled questions in modern macroeconomics.21 In
standard nonstochastic models there is no equity premium: in equilibrium all assets
yield a common rate of return. Researchers using these models must choose between
a parameter-choice strategy that delivers a relatively high common return rate, on
the order of the average real rate of return on equity, or a strategy that delivers a
relatively low common rate, on the order of the average real government bill yield.
They have almost invariably chosentheformer strategy, constructing modelsinwhich
the common asset return rate exceeds the output growth rate.
As we have indicated, we view the principal contribution of this paper as demon-
strating that the alternative low-common-return-rate strategy is quite viable, has a
number of important advantages, and is likely to provide a fruitful path for further
research. In this section, however, we present a brief analysis of the question of
whether our results are robust to the introduction of simple credit market frictions
that drive awedge between the real government bondrate and the realrate of return
on capital — a wedge wide enough to push the real capital return rate above the
output growth rate. The frictions we introduce are taxes on capital returns and costs
of financialintermediation. These frictions probably account for part of the observed
equity premium, and they are fairly easy to incorporate in nonstochastic models (at
least in stylized forms).
At one level, the question we have just posed has a clear and almost immediate
answer. We know that holding the rate of return facing savers fixed and introducing
frictions that drive the marginal product of capital upward will reduce the demand
for capital and increase the residual demand for government debt. And as long as we
structure our frictions so that the real interest rate paid by the government stays at
empirically plausibly levels, the government will continue to be able to roll its debt
over. Finally, since the real interest rate facing savers is the key determinant of the
implications of the model for consumption behavior, a respecification of the model
along the lines just described should leave these implications largely unaffected.
The only remaining question involves the size of the government debt. If the rest
of the baseline parameterization is unaltered, then driving the marginal product of
capital far above the output growth rate will reduce the demand for capital dramati-
cally enough to drive the bonds-output ratio to implausibly high levels. This situation
will also endanger the empirical plausibility of the baseline values of capital-related
variables such as the capital-output ratio andthe net saving rate. Is it possible to find
a plausible alternative parameterization that solves this problem without disrupting
the other appealing feaures of the baseline steady state?
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The basic reference is Mehra and Prescott (1985). The equity premium literature has recently
been surveyed by Kocherlakota (1996).
21We will show that the answer to this question is “yes.” The reparameterization
strategy we have developed involvesincreasing the capital share parameter a without
changing any other parameters from their baseline values. Increasing a tends to
increase the demand for capital without affecting the consumption-related features
of the steady state. Although our baseline value for a is standard in the literature
on life-cycle models, real business cycle studies typically use substantially higher
values. As aresult, we suspect that few economists will regard the relativelymoderate
increases in a that we are about to describe as empirically implausible.
The tax and intermediation assumptions behind the experiments described below
work as follows. We begin by assuming that all private credit is channeled through
zero-profits financial intermediaries who issue deposits to savers; government debt,
in contrast, may be held by savers directly. The intermediaries face a proportional
intermediation cost c. We will think of c as a proxy for the costs of dealing withthe
diversification and information problems associated with default risk, and possibly
also as a proxy for the premium for bearing undiversifiable risk.
Poterba (i997) estimates the average after-tax rate of return on U.S. corporate
capital during i959-i996 as 3.9 percent. We will round this figure to 4 percent.
When we include intermediation costs in our experiments we choose a value for c
of 0.03 because this value implies that the value of R~,the gross after-tax return
rate return received by the intermediaries from the firms, is i.04. DIaz-Giménez et
al. (i992) find that financial intermediation services account for 5-7 percent of total
output. In both experiments where we introduce intermediation costs the ratio of
total intermediation costs to output falls into this range.
The gross real interest rate the intermediaries pay on their deposits, which is
denoted Rb, will be equal to R~ — c. Note that Rb will also be equal to the gross real
interest rate on government debt.
Net nominal interest paid by government or private borrowers to savers is taxed
at a proportional “personal interest income” tax rate ~ To nominalize the returns
we will use ashadow inflation rate of 4 percent, which is close to the postwar average.
Thus, Rd, the gross real rate of return received by savers, will be related to R~’ by
the formula R’~= (1 — rP)Rb + rPR Here R, the gross real rate of return on
“money,” is equal to (1+it) 1, where it is the net inflation rate. Wewill set i” at the
level necessary to produce the observed one-percent difference between the average
before- and after-tax yields on short-term government debt. This level turns out to
be 20 percent (i-P = 0.2). We will set Rd at unity so that savers continue to receive
a net after-tax real interest rate of zero percent.
Next, we impose a second nominal return tax on the interest paid by private
borrowers (almost exclusively firms) to the intermediaries. We will call this tax rate
yC~ Wethink of ~ as a proxy for other direct and indirect taxes on capital income,
22including corporate profits taxes, capital gains taxes and historical cost depreciation.
The formula describingthe relationship between R7 and R, the gross real interest rate
paid by private borrowers, isR~ = (1— i-’)R~ +i-cRrn. Note that R = i+r —6, where
r is the rental rate on capital and is equal to the marginal product of capital. The
real interest rate relevant to agents’ consumption and saving decisions is Rd, while
the real rate relevant to firms’ investment decisions, and also to the determination
of the real wage rate, is R. We assume that the real revenue raised by these taxes
leaves the economy — the same assumption we have made about the revenue from
bond seigniorage. In the second and third experiments described below we target R
at 1.05 — afigure that substantially exceeds our baseline gross output growth rate of
1.032. In the fourth experiment we target R at 1.07 — avalue which is very close to
Mehra and Prescott’s (1985) estimate of the average real rate of return on equity in
the U.S. during the last century, and also to Cooley and Prescott’s (1995) estimate
of the average real return rate on U.S. business capital during the postwar period.
In our first experiment we set the personal interest income tax rate at 20 percent
(‘r” = 0.2) but set both the capital income tax rate and the proportional intermedi-
ation cost at zero. These choices duplicate the observed spread between the before-
and after-tax real government bond rates but do not produce any spread between
the before-tax real government bond rate and the marginal product of capital, which
remains substantially below the output growth rate. We then increase the capital
share parametera to a level necessary to keep the bonds-output ratio at its baseline
value of 0.59; this turns out to require a = 0.27.
In our second experiment we add acapital income tax at a rate necessary to drive
the marginal product of capital up to 5 percent, keeping the interest income tax rate
at 20 percent and the intermediation cost at zero. The required capital income
tax rate is 45 percent (i-a = 0.45). In our third experiment we add intermediation
costs (c = 0.03) and reduce the capital income tax rate to the level consistent with
R = 1.05; this requires a much more moderate tax rate of 11.3 percent (i-a = 0.113).
In each case, we keep the bonds-output ratio at its baseline level by increasing a to a
value slightly greater than 0.33. The fourth experiment is similar to the third except
that the target return rate on capital is 7 percent (R = 1.07). In this experiment we
leave c at 0.03: the required values of i-c and a are 0.277 and 0.358, respectively.
Table 1 displays the values of key endogenous variables in the steady states asso-
ciated with these experiments, along with their values for the baseline steady state.
In the table, the symbols B/Y and K/Y stand for the bonds-output ratio and the
capital-output ratio, respectively. The symbol S/Y stands for the net saving rate,
while Ac/c represents agents’ average lifetime consumptiongrowth rate and “1-share”
representsthe average labor share of agents’ time endowments. The next two symbols
represent summary measures of the hump-shapedness of the lifetime consumption
23Table 1
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Table 1: Results from alternative experiments.
profile: cso/c2, stands for the ratio of the consumption of middle-aged (50-year-old)
agents to that of new labor force entrants (2i-year-olds) at the same date, while
cso/c75 stands for the ratio of middle-aged consumption at a given date to the con-
sumption of agents who have reached the end of their lives (75-year-olds) at that
date. Finally, cK/Y stands for the ratio of intermediation costs to output, which is
relevant only in Cases 3 and 4.
The column for Case 1 indicates that this relatively limited reparameterization
has virtually no effect on the key endogenous variables. The columns for Cases 2
and 3 indicate that the effects of these experiments are not large either, even though
they produce steady states in which the net marginal product of capital substantially
exceeds the output growth rate. In each case, the new steady state delivers slightly
smaller values of the capital-output ratio and the net saving rate and does not have
significant effects on any other variables. The decline in the capital-output ratio may
slightly reduce the empirical plausibility of the steady state, but the decline in the
net saving rate probablyhas the opposite effect. Case 4 is very similar to Cases 2 and
3: the capital-output ratio and the net saving rate are a bit lower, but both values
remain quite plausible. On balance we think these last three alternative steady
states look remarkably similar to our baseline steady state, and we view them as
demonstrating that our results are robust to respecifications that drive the marginal
product of capital above the output growth rate.
244.2 Dynamic inefficiency
One interesting question raised by Cases 2-4 is whether these steady states are dy-
namically efficient. “Dynamic efficiency” is a term that is often used to characterize
some of the distinctive features of Samuelson-case equilibria. Most economists asso-
ciate dynamic efficiency with overaccumulation of capital — that is, with equilibria
in which the stock of capital has reached a level at which the marginal rate at which
resources can be transferred from the present into the future through capital ac-
cumulation (the marginal product of capital) is lower than the rate at which they
could be transferred via intergenerational exchanges (the output growth rate). In
steady states of this type the cost of maintaining the capital stock at its current level
relative to output (gross investment) exceeds the returns the capital stock provides
(gross capital income).
In Cases 2 and 4, the steady states are not dynamically inefficient in this “Type
A” sense: in each case, the marginal product of capital exceeds the output growth
rate and gross capital income exceeds gross investment.22 On the other hand, these
equilibriaremain inefficient in the “Type B” sensethat by holding government bonds,
agents are engaging in intergenerational transfers at a rate that is lower than the
transfer rate permitted by the physical environment (the growth rate of output),
and that is also lower than the (pretax) rate of return on physical assets.23 On the
margin, replacing government bonds with either direct intergenerational transfers or
physical capital would permit an increase in the consumption of every agent across
steady states. It is this sort of inefficiency that is relevant to our analysis, because
the low real interest rate on government debt allows the government to issue and roll
over a large stock of unbacked debt. From the viewpoint of applied macroeconomic
theory, it is the ability of dynamically inefficient equilibria to support unbacked debt
that gives rise to most of their unusual and interesting features.24
22
The Case 3 equilibrium is dynamically inefficient. Since we have assumed that there is no
way for the returns to capital to be distributed to households without incurring the intermediation
cost, the rate ofreturn on capital that is relevant to dynamic efficiency calculations is the marginal
product of capital less the intermediation cost rate, which we will call the received rate ofreturn on
capital (RRK). In Case 3 the marginal product of capital exceeds the output growth rate but the
RRK falls slightly short of it. In Case 2, where there are no intermediation costs, the RRK is well
above the output growth rate, and in Case 4 the RRK exceeds the output growth rate despite the
intermediation costs. 23
0ne can think of this type of inefficiency as resulting from bad tax policy on the part of the
government. It is similar to the inefficiency described by Freeman (1987) in his analysis of optimal
reserve requirements. In Freeman’s economy, however, the rate ofreturn on capital was high under
laissez faire and bad tax policy created a demand for unbacked government liabilities. In our
economies there is a demand for unbacked debt under laissezfaire and bad tax policy is responsible
for the high rate of return on capital.
24
For example, the results obtained by Espinosa and Russell (1998a,b) regarding the long-run
real effects of monetary policy depend criticially on the ability of their model to produce equilibria
with unbacked government debt. In the latter paper they show that their results are robust to the
inclusion of an intermediation cost that drives the marginal product of capital above the output
growth rate.
25In stochastic models, interest rate comparisons do not provide reliable tests of
dynamic efficiency. A steady state can be dynamically inefficient when the average
real return rate on capital is higher than the average output growth rate, or dy-
namically efficient when the average real interest rate on risk-free debt is lower than
the average output growth rate. Abel et al. (1989) test for dynamic efficiency by
comparing “gross profits” (gross capital income) to gross investment for the U.S. and
a number of other developed countries over the past 60 years. These calculations
indicate that gross profits have exceeded gross investment in every country in every
year. They conclude that the U.S. economy has been dynamically efficient.
The empirical calculations presented by Abel et al. implicitly define “gross profit-
s” as the total returns to capital paid by firms — a definition that does not make any
adjustment for taxes, intermediation costs, or other frictions that might reduce the
amount of income received by households. Aneconomy withintermediation costs can
have a steady state in which gross capital income before intermediation costs exceeds
gross investment in every period, even though gross capital income after intermedia-
tion costs is smaller than gross investment in every period. In this case the economy
would pass the Abel et al. test but would nevertheless be Type A inefficient (as in
Case 3; see note 22 above). Similarly, an economy with taxes on capital income can
have a steady state in which gross capital income always exceeds gross investment,
but in which differential taxes on returns paid by firms and the government produce
a level/distribution of the real interest rate on government debt low enough to allow
debt to be rolled over forever. In this case, the economy would pass the Abel et al.
test but would be Type B inefficient. Cases 2 and 4 are examples of nonstochastic
economies of this type. For this reason and others, we do not think the evidence
presented by Abel et al. (1989) endangers the empirical relevance of our analysis.25
4.3 Familial altruism
Empirical evidence indicates that many households transfer substantial quantities of
assets or goodsto younger or older family members, either during their lives (inter
vivos transfers) or via bequests, without requiring compensation that has a clear
market value. These transfers seem inconsistent with the assumption that agents
have selfish preferences. Most attempts to explain private intergenerational transfers
are based on the notion of familial altruism — that is, on the assumption that
households care about the welfare, consumption or income, etc., of family members
from different generations.
25
Another problem with the Abel et al. test is that the link between capital income and investment
in formal models andempirical definitions ofthese variables is not very clear, Abel et al. (1989) use a
broad empirical definition ofcapital income and a narrow definition of gross investment. Alternative
plausible definitions of these concepts could change the results of their calculations substantially.
For a more elaborate discussion ofthis question see Bullard and Russell (1997a).
26A relatively extreme familial-altruism assumption postulates that the utility of
a household’s direct descendants appears in the household’s utility function. This
“Becker-Barro” [Becker (1974), Barro (1974)] altruism has the well-known effect of
converting an overlapping generations model into what amounts to a representative-
agent infinite horizon model. As long as the transfer motive is uniformly active, so
that transfers occur at each date, each member of a dynastic sequence of households
makes the same decisions that would beprescribed by ahypothetical dynastic planner
who could transfer resources across consecutive generations of family members at a
rate equal to the output growth rate. As a result, models peopled by Becker-Barro
altruists do not have Samuelson-case equilibria.
Most alternative theories of altruistic, quasi-altruistic, or non-altruistic intergen-
erational transfers are not inconsistent with the existence of Samuelson-case equi-
libria. This point has most often been made in connection with the closely related
question of Ricardian equivalence.26 Interest in Ricardian equivalence and related
questions has produced alargeliterature on the empiricalplausibility ofBecker-Barro
altruism. The findings of this literature suggest that most bequests and transfers are
either non-altruistic or are driven by other forms of altruism. For example, Hurd
(1987,1989) finds that most bequests seem to be accidental, resulting from lifespan
uncertainty and incomplete annuities markets rather than any deliberate attempt
on the part of agents to provide funds for their descendants. There are also a large
number of papers that test and reject key predictions of the Barro-Becker theory
using data on inter vivos transfers (which are clearly deliberate) and/or apparently
deliberate bequests.27
There isa substantial theoretical literature on non-Becker-Barro transfer motives.
Typically, introducing these motives into overlapping generations models increases
the supply of capital and makes it easier to obtain Samuelson-case steady states.
The logic behind this is simple: in a steady state, deliberate bequests and gifts
represent capital passed from generation to generation, so additional capital must
be accumulated in order to provide them. In addition, ifagents are reasonably risk
aversethen introducing lifetime uncertainty andaccidental bequests tends to promote
capital accumulation by generating precautionary saving — as in Huggett (1996).
26
5ee Abel (1985) concerning accidental bequests, Bernheim et al. (1985) regarding bequests
driven by exchange motives, Andreoni (1989) for “warm glow” transfer motives and Abel (1987)
and Kimball (1987) regarding altruistic transfers from children to parents. O’Connell and Zeldes
(1993) generalize the Abel-Kimball analyses in a way that rules out dynamic efficiency whenagents
have positive time preference, but not otherwise.
27
Wjth regard to bequests, see Menchik (1980), Bernheim et al. (1985) and Wilhelm (1996).
Wilhelm’s work is particularly noteworthy because he studies asample ofvery wealthy households,
and it is these households who seem to account for high percentage ofthe bequests that do appear
to be deliberate, For inter vivos transfers see Cox (1987) and Cox and Rank (1992) and Altonji et
al. (1997) In addition, Altonji et al. (1992) find that within extended families thedistibution ofcon-
sumption is independent ofthe distribution ofhousehold resources — a finding that is inconsistent
with the Becker-Barro theories of both inter vivos transfers and bequests.
27The beliefthat intergenerational transfer motives tend to increase aggregate sav-
ing has led a number of authors, including Kolikoff and Summers (1981) and Auer-
bach and Kotlikoff (1987), to argue that introducing these motives into standard life
cycle models may allow them to generate empirically plausible saving rates. How-
ever, bequests and gifts have a wealth effect on the consumption of recipients that
tends to partly offset their direct effect on the supply of capital. Rangazas and Lord
(1991) and Lord (1992) find that the effect is strong enough to make it impossible for
bequest-augmented life-cycle models to generate realistic saving rates. As we have
noted, our low-real-interest rate approach to specifying life-cycle models allows us
to produce empirically plausible saving rates without introducing intergenerational
transfer motives.
While the jury on the empirical plausibility of Becker-Barro altruism may still
be out, the large body of evidence against this particular motive for intergener-
ational transfers provides abundant justification for continued research using cali-
brated models from which it is absent — including and especially models that have
Samuelson-case equilibria. Models with selfish preferences and certain lifetimes are
natural starting point for this research, but it will eventually have to confront the
empirical evidence on the nature and scale of private intergenerational transfers. For
this reason and others, we think that introducing uncertain lifetimes, warm glow
bequests and/or other, more complicated transfer motives into analyses such as ours
would be an interesting and useful extension of our research.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have specified an overlapping-generations model with features that
capture a large number of important characteristics of empirical economies. These
features include agents who live for many periods, neoclassical production, capital
accumulation, nontrivial labor-leisure decisions, life-cycle productivity changes, pop-
ulation growth, and technological progress. We have calibrated this model using
parameter values that are standard in the calibration literature and/or have sub-
stantial empirical support. Our analysis of this plausibly calibrated version of the
model demonstrates that it can support “monetary steady states” — Samuelson-case
steady states in which the government can maintain a large real stock of unbacked
debt. These steady states can replicate a large number of important long-run fea-
tures of U.S.postwar data, including the relatively low real interest rates on risk-free
debt, the decline in the U.S.debt-GDP ratio despite the absence oflarge or persistent
primary surpluses, the relatively high ratio of net savings to GDP, and the humped
shape of the average household’s age-consumption profile. We have shown that the
existence of these monetary steady states is robust to relatively large changes in the
values of most of the parameters of the model. We have also demonstrated that the
28properties of our baseline steady state are also robust to the addition of credit market
frictions that drive the rate of return on capital above the output growth rate.
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